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Abstract 
Safety-critical systems embedded in avionics and automotive systems are becoming 
increasing complex. Components with different requirements typically share a common 
distributed platform for communication. To accommodate varied requirements, many of these 
distributed real-time systems use FlexRay communication network. FlexRay supports both time-
triggered and event-triggered communications. In such systems, it is vital to establish a 
consistent view of all the associated processes to handle fault-tolerance. This task can be 
accomplished through the use of a Process Group Membership Protocol. This protocol must 
provide a high level of assurance that it operates correctly. In this thesis, we provide for the 
verification of one such protocol using Model Checking. Through this verification, we found that 
the protocol may remove nodes from the group of operational nodes in the communicating 
network at a fast rate. This may lead to exhaustion of the system resources by the protocol, 
hampering system performance. We determine allowable rates of failure that do not hamper 
system performance. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
In recent years, vehicles have been loaded with electronics which have increasingly 
defined the driving experience. Beginning with engine management and car audio, electronics 
have now penetrated all major systems in the vehicle, ranging from power train, body and 
chassis to driver-assistance systems and active and passive safety systems. A major concern with 
all of these electronics is safety. Vehicles are more prone to digress from their normal operation, 
in the event of sudden change, in how they operate. This is the reason why safety critical 
applications in automotive domains demand high reliability. In most applications, reliability is 
addressed by using fault-tolerant protocols. An example would be a process group membership 
protocol for FlexRay [1], which takes advantage of FlexRay’s dual scheduling ability. 
It may be observed that fault-tolerant distributed protocols are very subtle and informal 
arguments of correctness are prone to error. Such arguments are clearly insufficient for safety-
critical applications which require a high level of assurance in their operation. Ideally, 
mathematical proofs, either manual or automatic, for correctness of protocol should be provided. 
An alternative formal method is model checking of the protocol. In this thesis we envisage to 
formally prove the correctness of a membership protocol for FlexRay using model checking. 
 
1.1 Why FlexRay? 
The first step towards use of electronics in the car was by introducing digitally controlled 
combustion engines with fuel injection and digitally controlled anti-lock brake systems (ABS). A 
lot of functionalities such as traction control (TCS), electronic stability control (ESP), and brake 
assistant (BA) helped having close synergy between mechanics and electronics. This yielded 
several benefits which included better fuel economy, and better vehicle performance in normal 
and adverse conditions.   
Electronic and computer-based features continue to proliferate automotive industry, 
leading to widespread use of embedded real-time control networks. This is evident from Figure 
1.1, which gives a snapshot of present electronics systems and architectures in cars.  
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Figure  1.1 [12] Snapshot of in-car E/E Systems 
 
 
To gain additional performance means giving up mechanical linkages between driver and 
vehicle. The car industry has started using X-by-wire control. X-by-wire control will help make 
the car lighter.  
Critical to X-by-wire designs are the safety components of software, hardware, and in 
particular, computer networks that coordinate vehicle functions. This new technology requires 
more bandwidth for the communication [2]. The average bandwidth needed for engine and 
chassis control is estimated to reach 1500 kb/s in 2008 as opposed to 765 kb/s in 2004 and 122 
kb/s in 1994. The CAN protocol commonly used in the automotive industry, may soon be 
replaced by FlexRay, another protocol which provides the system advantages of higher 
bandwidth and support for both event-triggered (as CAN) and time-triggered communication. 
 
1.2 Safety Critical Systems 
A system is safety-critical if a failure of the system leads to consequences that are 
determined to be unacceptable. Thus, a system on which we depend for our well being is safety-
critical. For example if the brake for one wheel of a car fails, it may cause the car to go out of 
control. Thus, the braking system is definitely a safety critical system. 
Safety critical systems are called safety-related systems in the literature in the field. Neil 
Storey defines Safety related systems in his book ‘Safety Critical Computer System’: 
A safety related system is one by which the safety of equipment or plant is assured. 
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Though a system may claim to be safe, it is necessary to prove that the system is safe. To 
believe that a system is going to be used in the real world, we need a proof of a safe and correct 
system behavior.  Systems cannot be absolutely safe, but the safety level of a system must be 
sufficiently high for a specific task it’s supposed to perform.  
In the car example, when the brake for one wheel of a car fails the other brakes needs to 
be aware of this as soon as possible. They may then be able to compensate for the loss of one 
brake and stop the car almost as safely as with all brakes fully functioning. 
We can foretell the systems behavior when it is predictable. Hence, predictability is one 
of the most desired properties for safety related systems. 
 
 
1.3 Thesis Goals 
The project creates a UPPAAL model that closely matches a real-life FlexRay 
communication in vehicles. We then extend the model to support fault-tolerance in the FlexRay 
protocol. The model will then be used to verify the protocol using model checking. It will be 
further used for verifying of industrial systems – in this case, embedded controllers with timing 
aspects. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Background 
2.1 Fault Tolerance 
The objective of the use of fault tolerance is to design a system in such a way that faults 
do not result in system failure. It is not possible to prepare for all contingencies; hence designing 
a system which is 100% safe is impossible. The aim of a fault tolerant system is to provide 
maximal sustained system dependability to make the system “safe enough”.  
Today, the vehicles encompass more and more devices on board, which increase the 
chances of failure in the distributed system. The failures can grow arbitrarily large as number of 
components increase, hence we require the system to enter a state of graceful degradation. In this 
state the system will continues function in a decreased capacity when one or more components 
fail. 
Use of fault tolerance varies between one application and another. It improves reliability, 
dependability and safety. 
 
2.1.1Redundancy 
Fault tolerance is achieved by using some form of redundancy. Redundancy may be 
implemented on many levels such as software redundancy, hardware redundancy, time 
(temporal) redundancy or information redundancy [2]. 
2.1.1.1 Information Redundancy 
       In a system containing information redundancy supplementary information in      
addition to that needed by the system in absence of faults is used. Examples of information 
redundancy include parity bits or CRC checksums. 
2.1.1.2 Software Redundancy 
      Using software in addition to that required to implement a system in the absence of 
faults. Examples of these are membership algorithms. 
2.1.1.3 Hardware Redundancy 
       Using hardware in addition to what is required to implement a system in the absent 
of faults. Examples of this are airplane onboard computers. 
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2.1.1.4 Time Redundancy 
         Using time in addition to what is required to implement a system in the absence of 
faults. Example of this are recalculating a result multiple number of times and then using 
majority voting to obtain the final result. 
 
Many early fault tolerant systems duplicate hardware in such a way that if one module 
failed the rest of the system would still function normally. One example is a TMR (Triple 
Modular Redundancy) system where there are identical modules which produce the same output. 
A voting procedure was used to detect faulty units.  
 
2.1.2 Reliability 
When talking about safety related systems different terms such as reliability and 
availability are examples of topics. A safety critical system such as a brake-by-wire system in a 
car must be reliable. Storey defines reliability as “The probability of a component, or system, 
functioning correctly over a given period of time under a given set of operating conditions” [3]. 
One common definition is to denote reliability over time by R (t) and define it for a given 
number N of identical components that start operating at the same time as: 
 
                                    R (t) = n (t)/N 
where n (t) is the number of components still operating correctly at time t. For a system 
consisting of different sets of redundant components one may use reliability models such as 
reliability diagrams to find the reliability of the entire system. The configuration of the system 
components, their individual reliability and the number of redundant units will all greatly 
influence the reliability, cost and performance of the system. When designing a dependable 
system this adds considerable complexity to finding the optimum configuration. 
 
2.2 System Model 
We consider a distributed system framework, comprised of a completely connected 
network of (N) nodes that supports both time-triggered and event- triggered communication. We 
consider the system communication model as: 
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A1. A path exists from each node to all other nodes (i.e., a completely connected 
network). A node issues a single message which is broadcast through its associated 
communication link. 
A2. A non-faulty node can identify the sender of an incoming message, and can detect 
the discrepancy in an expected message. A faulty link can abrupt the message delivery but 
cannot correct an erroneous message. 
A3. All processors execute different amounts of workload and determine the output value 
Vi through the use of a voting function.                                                           
A4. Node and link faults are considered indistinguishable: Links are considered as simple 
memory less interfaces between nodes. 
 
A processor consists of one incoming link and one outgoing link. The incoming and 
outgoing links, broadcast message to receivers and receive message from other processors 
respectively. The protocol is non authenticated message passing; where the communication is 
organized into periodically repeated cycles of equal length. They contain a static and dynamic 
segment and network idle time. In addition, every message is checked for errors; thus, it is 
difficult for a malicious node to forge as a different processor. We assume that the processor 
supports clock synchronization. 
2.3 Fault Model 
 
System failures are assumed to be due to inconsistent decisions or computations across 
the system. Thus, it is necessary to identify faulty nodes and prevent system failure in the 
presence of a specific number of faults. Fault models need to cover a range of fault types. Thus, 
flexibility in fault model helps in incorporating realistic system environment. 
In [1], distinguishes failure into asymmetric and symmetric. Symmetric failures are 
perceived by all non-faulty nodes which occur due content failure in messages, process crashes 
in the system. For example a node receives a message which fails to match its checksum, then 
that node is considered to be faulty and removed from the membership group. An asymmetric 
failure causes the node to obtain an inconsistent view of the membership state. This occurs when 
a subset of nodes in the system receive message incorrectly. 
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The Hybrid Fault-Effects Model presented in [6, 7] is based on fault-detection 
mechanisms built in at the node level and on nodes exchanging their local opinion with other 
nodes in the system. Classification in HFM begins with the examination of fault states created by 
the dispersal of information. As shown in fig 2.1 general cases are possible when a node 
transmits information in the network. (a) all receivers obtain the same information i.e., mess_j 
(symmetric dispersal), or (b) receivers obtain different information i.e., mess_j and mess_j’ 
(asymmetric dispersal). 
 
Figure  2.1 Hybrid Fault Space (a) symmetric communication (b) asymmetric 
communication 
 
 
The second aspect of the HFM is based on propagation effects of a faulty source. If an 
individual node is sufficient to detect the error, it is classified as a benign fault since the fault-
effect is locally detectable. On the other hand, there are situations that require multiple nodes to 
exchange their syndrome information with each other in order to provide accurate diagnosis, i.e., 
globally detectable. For these cases, the values in a message appear to be plausible locally at a 
node_j 
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node; however, they can only be verified with a multiple exchange of information. After the 
exchange is completed, the plausible value may be determined to be value-faulty. 
We need to ensure that distributed nodes or processes arrive at the same decisions and 
computational results in the presence of arbitrary faults. Thus, Byzantine [8] agreement 
algorithms are implemented. 
2.4 FlexRay 
We need a communication system that handles applications limited by the bit rate of 
CAN. A system that offers redundancy in developing solutions which sends same messages 
several times or by providing two  separate channels transmitting the same data. The system 
should be able to serve all future electronic functions in motor vehicles. In order to attain these 
objectives, a FlexRay consortium with it original members BMW, Daimler-Chrysler, Philips and 
Motorola was formed. The cooperation between some car manufacturers and electronics 
manufacturers resulted into a communication system called FlexRay. It is a system for advanced 
automotive control applications. The Consortium has grown to include some of the automotive 
industry’s largest and most influential players, including Bosch, General Motors, and VW among 
others [4]. 
2.4.1 Overview 
FlexRay is a network protocol based on TDMA scheme. The access to the medium is 
predetermined with time slots which structurally eliminates any possibility of message collision. 
It supports both time-triggered and event-triggered communication. The maximum bandwidth in 
FlexRay network is 10 Mbit/s. The two basic topologies used in FlexRay are the bus topology 
and the star topology. These topologies can be combined to form hybrid topologies over one or 
two channels. The support for dual channels improves fault tolerance in FlexRay protocol. 
Safety-Critical systems can use a second channel in order to transmit a redundant copy of the 
data on the first channel. It may setup to use either only one channel or two channels 
simultaneously when sending data. The minimum number of nodes in a FlexRay network is 2, 
and the maximum number of connected nodes is 64. 
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Figure  2.2 [5] Topologies used in FlexRay 
 
 
Communication cycle 
Communication in FlexRay takes place through repetitive communication cycles, each 
cycle consists of a static segment, a dynamic segment, an optional symbol window and finally a 
phase in which the network is in idle mode, called network idle time (NIT) 
 
Figure  2.3[9] Different Segments making up a communication cycle 
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2.4.1.1 Static Segment 
The part of the communication cycle in which access to the medium is monitored and 
controlled by a static time division multiple access principle is called the static segment in the 
FlexRay protocol. The static segment consists of a configurable number of slots, each slot 
containing room for the same amount of data. Messages are broadcasted to every other node in 
the network.  When there is a need for communication which cannot be completed in one slot, 
the node is assigned several slots which give it a larger static piece of communication. It is also 
possible for a node to only listen to a channel by not being assigned to any slot at all. The slots 
that are not assigned to any node and the slots assigned to broken nodes will be silent. The static 
segment provides deterministic communication which defines the semantics of status messages 
and manages distributed systems. 
2.4.1.2 Dynamic Segment 
The dynamic segment is used to send event-triggered messages. This part of the 
communication cycle consists of mini slots which controls and monitors the access to the 
medium. This is also known as flexible time division multiple access (FTDMA).   The dynamic 
segment is divided into minislots such that each slot has a unique frame id. Each mini-slot will 
be extended to a full-size dynamic slot when the node assigned to the current mini-slot has a 
message to transmit.  
A minislot counter is used to provide collision avoidance in the dynamic segment. 
During a cycle the minislot counter value increases with a short time interval between ticks. A 
dynamic message is then sent when its frame id is equal to the current value of the minislot 
counter. When there is nothing to be sent in the dynamic segment of a cycle, then the minislots 
have same length. When a message is sent in the dynamic segment the duration of the minislot 
expands until the end of the message transmission.  For example, in figure 2.2 the message F2 is 
being sent on channel two during most of the dynamic segment of that cycle. The message E2 
can not be transmitted until the transmission of F2 has completed. In this way collision voidance 
is implemented in the dynamic segment. Two dynamic messages can never attempt to transmit at 
the same time on the same channel. This is the case because each message has a unique Frame 
ID. During the transmission of a message the value of the minislot counter is unchanged. 
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2.4.1.3 Network Idle Time 
It is time at the end of each cycle. This phase is used for performing implementation 
specific related tasks NIT is used synchronization of timing in the protocol.  
 
2.4.2 Timing Hierarchy 
 
Time in a FlexRay node is represented by cycles, macroticks and microticks. The highest 
level, the communication cycle level, defines the communication cycle. A cycle builds on an 
integer number of macroticks. A macrotick is composed of an integer number of microticks. A 
microtick is a multiple of the clock tick of an oscillator in the communication controller. Since 
the tick length of oscillators in different communication controllers vary slightly, this has the 
signification that the length of a microtick is controller specific i.e. it may vary between different 
communication controllers. 
 
Figure  2.4 [10] Time Hierarchy in FlexRay Controller 
 
 
The FlexRay controller measures time on a local as well as global time basis. The local 
time in a node is defined as the time determined by using the node’s internal clock. The global 
time of a cluster is defined as the commonly agreed upon view of the passage of time inside a 
cluster. A global time is periodically determined through the exchange of messages, and the local 
time in each node is subsequently adjusted to match the global time. 
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2.4.3 Clock Synchronization 
 
It is essential that the local time in the various nodes in a FlexRay network remains 
synchronized. Therefore the difference between local time in a node and the global time must not 
differ by any large amount. Any node straying too much from the local time too long is 
disconnected from the network. The time synchronization is done by the sending of a reference 
message in the static segment. The message is sent by the pre-selected synchronization nodes 
(nodes that have the sync bit in the header set). 
 
2.5 UPPAAL 
 
UPPAAL [11] is an open source tool for simulation and verification of real-time and 
embedded systems modeled as real-time components. It is jointly developed by the Uppsala 
University and Aalborg University. 
It has a Java interface with verification engine written in C++. This tool helps verify 
systems that can be modeled as networks of timed automata extended with integer variables, 
structured data types, and channel synchronization. It also supports graphical modeling of 
internal component behavior as Uppaal timed automata, and hierarchical composition of 
components. We can also use the simulator to explore the dynamical behavior of components, 
and can be used to call the model-checker of Uppaal PORT to verify properties expressed in a 
subset of timed CTL.  
UPPAAL has undergone several changes since it conception in 1995, most versions 
consisting of additions to their earlier counterparts. Some of the additions include, experiments 
and improvements include data structures, partial order reduction, symmetry reduction, a 
distributed version of Uppaal, guided and minimal cost reachability, work on UML Statecharts, 
acceleration techniques and new data structures and memory reductions. 
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Uppaal consists of three main parts: a description language, a simulator and a model-
checker. The description language is a non-deterministic command language which serves as a 
modeling or design language to describe system behavior as networks of automata. The 
simulator is a validation tool which enables examination of possible dynamic executions of a 
system during early design stages. It provides an inexpensive means for fault detection prior to 
verification by the model-checker. The model-checker is used to check invariant and reachability 
properties by exploring the state-space of a system. 
The model-checking in UPPAL is based on the theory of Timed Automata and its 
modeling language. The query language of UPPAAL which is a subset of CTL (computation tree 
logic) [3, 35] is used to specify the properties to be checked. 
 
2.5.1 Timed Automata 
A timed automaton is a finite-state machine with clock variables. A system is modeled as 
a network of several such timed automata in parallel, with bounded discrete variables that are 
part of the state. These discrete variables can read, write and are subject to common arithmetic 
operation as in any programming language. A state of the system is defined by the locations of 
all automata, the clock constraints, and the values of the discrete variables. 
 
2.5.2 UPPAAL Query Language 
The model checker is used to verify the automata with respect to the given requirement 
specifications. The requirement specification is expressed in a formally well-defined and 
machine readable language. UPPAAL uses a simplified version of CTL for requirement 
specification for the model checker. State formulae are described as individual states, whereas 
path formulae quantify over paths or traces of the model. Path formulae can be further classified 
into reachability, safety and liveness. 
We will describe each of the different path formulae supported by Uppaal. 
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Figure  2.5 [11] Path Formulae Supported in UPPAAL 
 
 
2.5.2.1 State Formulae 
A state formula is an expression which is evaluated for a state without looking at the 
behavior of the model. For example consider the expression, a = 10. This expression could be 
applicable for a state X of the automaton, that is true in a state whenever a equals 10. The syntax 
of state formulae is a superset of that of guards. 
2.5.2.2 Reachability Properties 
A reachable property is a property that can eventually hold true. A reachability property 
checks if a given state formula, possibly can be satisfied by any reachable state. They are often 
used in designing a model to perform sanity checks. A reachability property will not guarantee 
the correctness of the protocol but only validate the basic behavior of the model. 
A special case would be the state formulae for a deadlock. The formula simply consists of 
the keyword deadlock and is satisfied for all deadlock states. 
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2.5.2.3 Safety Properties 
Safety properties are properties which are required to hold at all times i.e. they are 
invariants. An example of a safety property would be the operating temperature of a nuclear 
plant which is always (invariantly) required to be under a certain threshold. In Uppaal these 
properties are formulated positively, e.g., something good is invariantly true. 
2.5.2.4 Liveness Properties 
Liveness property is a property which will hold true within a certain time bound. An 
example of a liveness property would be any message that has been sent should eventually be 
received, in any model of a communication protocol. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Membership Protocol 
This section gives a detailed description of the membership protocol that has been 
modeled in this thesis. The membership protocol under consideration for distributed real-time 
systems supports both time-triggered and event triggered communication. The protocol consists 
of the algorithms that are described below. 
3.1 Overview: 
The membership protocol under consideration was proposed by Carl Bergenhem and 
Johan Karlsson in their article “A process Group membership Service for Active Safety Systems 
using TT/ET Communication Scheduling". In this thesis, this protocol has been modeled in 
Uppaal and verified. 
A membership protocol is a membership service based on the idea that each node in the 
network creates its own view of the status of all other nodes in the network, i.e. which nodes are 
operational and which are not. A common view is formed based on the individual views of each 
of the nodes.  
A common view is obtained by conducting a majority voting (poling), with a variety of 
random messaging by any/all nodes in the communication network. FlexRay being a time 
triggered protocol, each node in the network decides onto the absence/presence of a particular 
message on the network. This allows the protocol to decide whether a node is operational or not 
in the network. Thus when applied to a distributed real-time system, the protocol allows a group 
of operating real time processes to establish a "consistent" view of the operational status of the 
network. The protocol is developed to be applied to any application domain, but has been 
developed taking into consideration automotive active safety systems. A membership protocol 
would provide invaluable support for implementing fault tolerance and graceful degradation. 
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3.2 HeartBeat Message 
Figure  3.1 Heartbeat Message 
 
An important function of the membership protocol is the failure detection. The 
membership protocol should be able to detect the failure of a process which does not respond as 
expected. The FlexRay protocol, being a time triggered protocol simplifies this process, each 
node on the network decides whether a node is operational in the network. Each process is 
associated with a specific static slot in which it sends a message via the run time environment, a 
message once during each cycle. This message is also known as the heartbeat message. Each 
message in these static slots has a specification of timing for each node. Any deviation from the 
specified timing implies failure of the associated process, which is noticed in the run time 
environments of the nodes. 
Conversely, each slot in has a fixed association with a process / node. A failure detection 
scheme is based on the presence of the "heartbeat" message as well as a contained status flag. 
The presence of the heartbeat message with the status flag on, implies that the associated process 
is correct and indirectly the run - time environment of the hosting node. It may also be noted that 
a node can be associated with several processes. Thus there can be several heartbeat messages 
associated with a node during each cycle. It may also be noted that a heartbeat message can be 
lost or corrupted during transmission. This only leads to faulty conclusion, indicating that the 
associated process is faulty. 
The heartbeat message may also contain a data payload from the process, apart from the 
failure detection associated with it. This data payload may be consumed by the receiving process 
to perform its task. Each heartbeat message has 3 status flags associated with it, which are used 
for failure detection and the data payload carried by it from any communicating process to a 
receiving process. Each flag can be set or reset by the run - time environment .The flags are: 
heartbeat status (HB flag), join - request flag (J - flag), membership status flag (MR flag), see Fig 
3.1.The HB flag is associated with the process of fault detection of the process in the 
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communication network. The HB flag encodes one of the following states, concerning the 
corresponding process:  dead, beating, signaled failure report. The status of the HB - flag when 
set to "beating", indicates that the sender membership service considers corresponding process to 
be a member. The HB flag when set to dead signifies that the associated process is not a member 
of the communication network. When the HB flag is set to signal failed report, it indicates that 
the payload of the message contains a failure report instead of the expected data from the sending 
process. A failure report is generated by the run - time environment, which may contain detailed 
information about the failure of one or many process. 
 
3.3 Protocol 
The protocol operation is divided into three phases that take place during different parts 
of a FlexRay cycle. The protocol proposed by [1] support nodes with multiple processes. 
Figure  3.2 Membership Protocol in FlexRay Cycle 
 
The basic function of the protocol is to form an opinion about the presence and the status 
of heartbeat messages. Each active node in the communication network broadcasts its opinion at 
the end of each communication cycle. Thus each active node in the network has complete 
information about the opinion of all the other nodes in the network. Thus each node can make a 
decision about the status of processes during the previous cycle. The local opinion of an active 
node may differ due to asymmetric failures .It may be noted that local opinions are inconsistent 
with the majority opinion .So asymmetric failures are manifested as content failures from the 
affected nodes. The most important function of the protocol is to differentiate between an 
asymmetric failure and failure at the receiver or the sender in the network. 
The protocol is executed by each node in the communication network. When processing 
is completed by the protocol, the membership view is available at each node. It may be noted 
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that the protocol messages must be send in each cycle, where each message may or may not be in 
a static slot, thus facilitating the absence of a event triggered communication scheme. Also, local 
opinions need to be exchanged between the nodes, in case of change in the system. In the event, 
that no local opinion needs to be exchanged, more network capacity is available for other event 
triggered messages to be sent on the network. The protocol tolerates failures as long as at-least a 
majority of nodes are active during two cycles. 
3.3.1Basic Protocol 
The operation of the protocol is divided into 3 phases: failure detection, membership 
communication, membership decision. Figure 3.3 shows the phases of the protocol. 
 
Figure  3.3 Communication Cycle in Conjunction with the phases of the protocol 
 
Failure Detection 
Heartbeat messages are observed on all active nodes during the failure detection phase. 
The local opinion comprises of an incoming heartbeat message in combination with a heartbeat 
status flag (HB flag). 
The local opinion concerning a process can be a  'member', which implies that the 
heartbeat message was received correctly and the HB flag is set to 'beating' while 'nonmember', 
which implies that the heartbeat message was received correctly but the HB flag is set to 'dead' or 
the heartbeat is corrupt (content failure) or the slot is silent (silent failure).  
 
Membership Communication 
The nodes in the network will perform the membership communication phase during the 
dynamic communication segment of the cycle. During every cycle, protocol messages, consisting 
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of the local opinions are broadcast during the membership communication phase in the network. 
Protocol message are allocated priorities, to get precedence over other messages, in every cycle. 
Each node will form what is called an opinion matrix, which is assembled from the received 
local opinions in the protocol messages. Each row will contain the opinion from a particular node 
while columns will contain all nodes opinion concerning a particular process. This allows all 
nodes will have had an opportunity to send their opinions, at the end of the dynamic segment. If 
there are no failures during the cycle, then the opinion matrix will be fully populated with 
opinions from all the nodes. If there any other event triggered message in the cycle, they will 
follow the protocol messages. The dynamic segment is assumed to consist of a minimum of N 
dynamic slots, each for every node. 
 
Membership Decision 
A candidate membership view is obtained by applying the majority voting decision 
function to the opinion matrix, in the membership decision phase. Any process from the 
membership group, hosted by nodes which failed to send messages or have send messages which 
differ from the result of the decision function are removed from the candidate view. Thus the 
membership candidate view is further processed to be made available to distributed tasks in the 
system. Any node which no longer hosts a process in the membership group or any node which 
leads to the decision function giving an undefined outcome for any process is deactivated. Thus 
the possible status of any process is: member or non-member. 
 
During the operation of the protocol, it is possible for a node to signal failure. The node 
which receives the failure signal uses it to modify the membership view bypassing the 
membership protocol. If the current cycle is affected by further failures, the protocol is executed 
as usual. Thus the signaled failure mode enables status of the membership view of the system to 
be reached faster and incurring less overhead by using the protocol itself. 
  
The correctness of the protocol is decided primarily by the fact that half the nodes in the 
communication network are active during two cycles of the protocol. Each active node send local 
its local opinion and the decision function masks any faulty opinions (including content failure 
and silent failure).Thus two cycles of membership processing are required to correctly handle 
 21 
content failures, depending the instance at which failure occurs during the cycle .The faulty node 
must intelligently detect a failure has occurred and cease membership operation by listening to 
the opinions of other nodes during the two cycles. The active nodes receive a confirmation as to 
the failure suffered by the faulty node. A consistent membership status is reached after the two 
worst cycles after the last failure. 
3.3.2 Process Integration 
The basic protocol is modified to allow integration of excluded processes and reactivation 
of deactivated nodes. The reactivation of a node is indirect, since a node is reactivated when the 
associated process is re-integrated into the network. The heartbeat message sent in the static slot 
during the failure detection phase is appended with the join request flag. When the run time 
environment allows an excluded process to integrate m the J flag in the heartbeat message is set. 
At this instant, the HB flag is set to 'dead', indicating that process is not yet considered to be a 
member. If a node is reactivated, its membership view is reset, such that all processes in the 
system are members. This is followed by failure detection and the re-activated node builds its 
local opinion, participating in the membership communication and decision phases as if an active 
node and the corresponding process as a member. 
The opinion from an active node with a re-integrating process is considered as 'non-
faulty', on par with the local opinion of other active nodes, since its opinion is now in accordance 
with the other active nodes. However, this opinion is not considered by the decision function of 
the other active nodes. Its opinion is instead checked so that at least the same processes are 
members, compared to the result of the decision function in the correct nodes. It the opinion is 
not checked, the reactivating node has suffered failure during re-integration. The node is 
deactivated and the membership of the processes is removed from the correct nodes. If no such 
failure occurs then the re-integrating process will rest the J flag and set the HB flag to beating in 
the next cycle, indicating that the process is considered to be a member and the hosting node is 
active. 
Each node also sends an upper bound on the number of active nodes, in addition to its 
local opinion. This helps a reactivating node to correctly perform the decision function, though it 
is reactivated into a system of active and inactive nodes, thereby receiving fewer opinions. The 
upper bound on the number of active nodes is activated at the end of the membership decision 
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phase, when the number of active nodes in the system is known appropriately. It may be need 
that the delay from the join request to potential acceptance in the members group is at worst two 
cycles. 
3.3.3 Event Triggered Scheduling 
When a change of status occurs i.e. when a heartbeat message is missed or in the event of 
a re-integration attempt, this step is to perform the membership communication and decision 
phases .A node may use the membership request flag, in addition to the heartbeat message to 
communicate to the other active nodes in the system, whether it will perform membership 
communication or membership decision in the next cycle. When a change is detected in the 
system or a node receives a heartbeat message with the MR flag set, the node will set it own MR 
flag to signal to the other nodes. Thus the correct nodes perform membership communication 
and decision phases. This may occur if a failure affects the last heartbeat message in the cycle. 
The remaining nodes detect the failure in the next node and the membership phase will be 
performed .The membership phases are executed in the same cycle as would be performed in the 
event of change in the membership status. This allows handling of failures from the previous 
cycle in the membership phase. 
A node must also keep track of the "generation number of the membership group, 
included together with the protocol messages sent in the membership communication. The local 
generation number is incremented, for every membership phase performed .Thus it may be noted 
that the generation number of all the nodes must be the same during normal operation. If a node 
receives an opinion with a generation number higher than its own, it will deactivate itself. 
Similarly, if a node receives an opinion with a generation number lower than its own, then the 
opinion from the node is disregarded in forming the opinion matrix. 
3.3.4 Decision Function 
A decision function returns a consistent decision of the status of a process based on the 
local opinions of active nodes in the system. Each process in the system can have a differently 
configured decision function  
A decision function is based on two operands, a vector containing local opinions from all 
the active nodes in the system concerning a specific process and the threshold value 'u' of the 
number of active nodes in the system. The vector will contain the status of the process, as 
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determined by all the active nodes in the system. Each opinion in the vector may or may not be a 
member in the system. The threshold value sets the required number of opinions to set up an 
opinion matrix, since a majority [u/2] can be determined and the outcome of the opinion matrix 
be defined.  The decision function returns the opinion that at least [u/2] nodes have about a 
process; i.e., member or non member. A lost opinion message indicates a missing local opinion 
from an active node (or fewer number of active nodes as compared t the threshold value 'u') or 
the outcome is undefined. The protocol then deactivates the node associated with the missing 
local opinion. If the number of active and inactive nodes is equal, the outcome is prioritized 
according to non-member and member nodes. 
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CHAPTER 4 - Verification Model 
In this model we focus on the operation of membership service for the FlexRay Protocol. 
We assume that the clocks are synchronized in this model. 
4.1 Model Layout 
The model consists of five components, each with its own template: GlobalClock, Node, 
Scheduler, DTask and Bus. Each node needs an instantiation of the Node and DTask template. 
The latter handles processes that run on the node. The former represents the runtime environment 
microprocessor and handles everything else, like communication with the bus and sending data 
to the bus. 
In the model, for every process running in the node we instantiate DTask template 
specifying its id, slot number and node (where it is being executed). A process can have 
membership status: member or not member, initially the membership status of all processes is 
member. Each DTask i.e. process can only communicate with its own Node and each Node only 
with its own DTask, not with other DTasks. 
 
The Bus template needs to be instantiated only once, as there is just one Bus to connect 
all Nodes in the system. This automaton transfers messages from and to the nodes. The 
GlobalClock automaton is only instantiated once as well. It makes sure the model’s cycle 
completion is known to all automatons. 
 
The FlexRay protocol consists of Static and Dynamic segments followed by Network Idle 
time; similarly the Node’s behavior is modeled in Uppaal. The Scheduler keeps track of time and 
slot counter for Static and Dynamic segments. The Node’s runtime environment communicates 
with its respective processes and sends the data on the bus when it is scheduled to send during 
the static segment. Node informs the process about its membership status after every 
membership communication phase. 
 
In the model, we allow a predefined number ‘Slots’ for the static segment and the 
dynamic segment. This is done by manipulating variables ‘gStSlots’ and ‘gMinSlots’. Each static 
 25 
and dynamic slot has predefined time assigned to it. The Scheduler automaton increases the 
static slot counter by one, whenever the clock reaches the predefined slot time. Scheduler 
changes its state from Static or Dynamic, whenever clock time reaches ‘gStSlots’ or ‘gMinSlots’. 
Then the slot counter is reset to 0 and the procedure starts anew.  
Since we have assumed that the clock is synchronized, the slot counter is global for this 
model. ‘vSlotCounter’ for Static Segment and ‘dvSlotCounter’ for Dynamic Segment are the slot 
counters for each segment. It is assumed that Dynamic Segment schedules all the nodes for 
membership communication. 
 
Here is an example system definition using three 4 nodes and 5 processes: 
 
 system Process, N1, N2,N3,N4,c1,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,b1,a; 
 
And the matching process assignments: 
 
N1 = Node (1, 7, 1); 
N2= Node (2, 6, 2); 
N3= Node (4, 6, 3); 
N4= Node (3, 6, 4); 
 
d1 = DTask (1, 1, 1); 
d2 = DTask (2, 2, 2); 
d3 = DTask (3, 3, 1); 
d4 = DTask (4, 4, 3); 
d5 = DTask (5, 5, 4); 
4.2 Bus 
First we take a brief look at the Bus. Throughout this model the Bus is treated as a 
medium, in which a node can put a message and from which the other nodes can then take that 
message out again. The bus uses two synchronization channels, ‘bmessage’ and ‘message’. 
Several global variables are used for reading from and writing to the bus. Five of them input data 
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into the bus: ‘pID’, ‘Hb’, ’JR’, ’M_R’, ’NodeID’. This sets the message the bus will send. 
‘NodeID’ should be the sending node’s id. ‘Hb’, ’JR’, ’M_R’ are the node’s heartbeat status. 
‘pID’ is process ID sending the message along with its heartbeat. 
Figure 4.1 shows the automaton of bus. Channel ‘bmessage’ is used for receiving 
message from the nodes which is the broadcasted to other nodes in the system. 
Figure  4.1 Bus Model in the System 
 
 
 
4.3 Global Clock 
The automaton synchronizes with other automaton using the channel ‘startup’, which 
initializes all the system. GlobalClock indicates that a round of communication is finished after 
every ‘CommCycle’ time and synchronizes with channel ‘finround’ to let other automaton know 
that a round of communication is over. 
Figure  4.2 Global Clock 
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4.4 DTask 
The DTask template has number of parameters to separate any number dtasks; i.e., 
processes. They are: ‘Pid’, ’Pslot’ and ‘Node’. 
‘Pid’ is the process id specific to the process and is used to indicate process which is 
sending the data on the bus. ‘Pslot’ is the slot number in which the process is scheduled to send 
data. ‘Node’ is the Node ID in which the process is running and is used for sending data to Node 
automaton using synchronization channel ‘Tmessage [Node]’. 
 
Figure  4.3 Processes in Member State 
 
As shown in figure 4.3. initially Dtask automaton is at ‘Member’ state, since all processes 
are members of the membership group. Whenever there is change in slot, current slot is checked 
with ‘Pslot’ to check if it can send data now. When ‘Pslot’ is equal to the current slot in the 
system, process sends data to the run time environment through Tmessage channel. 
DTask automaton makes a transition to ‘NotMember’ state, when the Node automaton 
synchronizes through the channel ‘status_change [Node]’. When the DTask is in ‘NotMember’ 
state and scheduled to send data on bus. It sends a join message request using the ‘Jmessage 
[Node]’ channel, see fig 4.4. 
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Figure  4.4 Processes in NotMember State 
 
4.5 Node 
The Node template has a number of parameters to allow a number of nodes to operate in 
the system. These parameters are:  dSlotId, time, Node 
‘Node’ ties this Node to a specific Node automaton and is used to share data between a 
Node and its processes. No other automata should access that data, although it would technically 
be possible to do that in UPPAAL.  
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Figure  4.5  Static Segment 
 
As shown in fig 4.5, ‘startup’ is the synchronization channel to initiate a Node. Once start 
up is completed, a node is in Static Segment state from there it can take three transitions. First, 
when the slot counter is increased, slot which is scheduled to send data on the bus. This happens 
through synchronization of ‘change’ channel. Afterward the Node automaton checks if the 
current slot of the system scheduled is equal to the slot number in which it is supposed to send. If 
the current slot in not equal to its slot number it returns to its previous state – StaticSegment. 
 
The second transition is taken by synchronizing with the ‘message’ channel, through 
which the node receives data sent by other nodes. The third transition is taken when the node 
synchronizes with ‘transition_st’ to go to dynamic segment. 
The Scheduler automaton will regularly update the slotcounter variable, as we will see in 
the next section. 
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Once the Node verifies that it is scheduled to send data on the bus, it moves to 
‘SendMessage’ state. During its transition to ‘SendMessage’ state, Node indicates to the process 
which is scheduled to send data which we have explained in previous section. 
The Node automaton receives either a message with heart beat or a message with a join 
request using synchronization channels ‘Tmessage [Node]’ and Jmessage [Node] respectively. 
Once the Node receives message from the process (DTask), it processes the message to be sent 
on the network. The runtime environment checks for the current view of the process and updates 
the status flags accordingly. The message is then sent on the bus using the synchronization 
channel ‘bmessage’. 
 
Figure  4.6  Dynamic Segment in Node 
 
 
Now we will talk about the ‘DynamicSegment’ state where the Node takes the transition 
after ‘gdStaticSlot’ time. The opinion matrix is first initialized to empty. In this state the 
automaton can take three transitions. First, if there is change in dynamic slot which is scheduled 
to send data on the bus. This happens through synchronization of the ‘change’ Channel. 
Afterward the Node automaton checks if the current dynamic slot of the system scheduled is 
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equal to the slot number in which it is supposed to send. If the current slot in not equal to its slot 
number it returns to its previous state –DynamicSegment. 
The second transition is taken by synchronizing with the ‘message’ channel, through 
which the node receives data sent by other nodes. The opinions sent by other nodes in system are 
recorded in the opinion matrix. The third transition is taken when the node synchronizes to go to 
Network Idle state. 
In the State dynamic, the Node send its opinion on the bus when membership 
communication request has been placed by another node or when the node has detected a change 
in its opinion during the StaticSegment state or Failure detection phase.  
Once it has sent its opinion it informs the scheduler automaton that it has finished 
sending on the bus through the finished synchronization channel. 
 
Figure  4.7  Network Idle State in Node 
 
 
During the Network Idle Time, the Node performs membership decision function. Once 
the new view of the processes in the system is updated, all nodes update the status of the process. 
As shown in fig 4.7, array Slots contains the Pid of all processes running on Node. For 
each process in the node, we check if there is change in opinion about the process. If yes then the 
process is assigned status NotMember by synchronizing with channel “status_change”. 
 
4.6 Scheduler 
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Figure  4.8  Scheduler 
 
The Scheduler automaton, shown in fig 4.8, is responsible for maintaining slot counter 
for Static and Dynamic Segments. 
On Startup, the slot counter for Static Segment ‘vSlotCounter’ is initialized to 1. The 
scheduler increments the slots counter after every ‘gdStaticSlot’ time. When the slot number is 
changed, all the nodes know about it through the synchronization channel ‘channel’. When the 
‘vSlotCounter’ reaches the maximum number of Static slots to be scheduled in Static segment, it 
transition to ‘Dynamic’ state and the nodes also transition to Dynamic Segment. This is done 
through the synchronization channel ‘transition_st’. 
 
In ‘Dynamic’ state, the scheduler automaton keeps track of the dynamic mini slots and 
the dynamic slot. A Dynamic Slot is made up of dynamic mini slots. The Scheduler increments 
the mini slots counter after every ‘gdMiniSlot’ time. When the Node automaton synchronizes 
with channel ‘finished’, indicating that it has finished using the bus, the Dynamic slot counter 
‘dvSlotCounter’ in CheckFinish() is incremented. This change in Dynamic slot counter is 
informed to the Nodes using the channel ‘change’. 
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Once the maximum number of mini slot is reached it transitions to NIT state. The 
Scheduler automaton stays in NIT state until it synchronizes with channel ‘finround’ with Global 
Clock. 
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CHAPTER 5 - Verification of Model 
The model that we have constructed is checked by certain number of behavioral 
properties. Behavioral properties extract the specification of the system. We need to see that the 
model respect the same behavioral constraints as its specifications. The list of such properties is 
given in table. 
Table  5.1  Verification Properties 
Properties Verified 
A[] not deadlock 
The system must have a cyclic infinite behavior, and never be deadlock 
Yes 
E<> N1.State ==-1 
In normal execution (without fault), state must never be equal to -1 
No 
A [] not (N1.SendMessage and (N2. SendMessage or N3. SendMessage or N4. 
SendMessage)) 
Only one node can be in SendMessage state at the same time 
Yes 
E<> d2.NotMember 
In an environment with faults, verify that Process 2 can be removed from the group 
by protocol. 
 
Yes 
E<> JR = 1 and d2.Member 
A join request can never be made when the process is member of the group. 
Yes 
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5.2 Liveness Property 
We use an Automaton ‘Agreement’ to check the liveness property of the model. In this 
we maintain an observer view on the membership of each node; hence we use this if the 
membership view of all the nodes is same as the observer view. We check: 
c1.Static --> a.Agree () 
Our model satisfies this property. 
The automaton for checking the property is show in figure 5.1 
Figure  5.1 Agreement Automata 
 
The code for Agree is as follows 
bool Agree () { 
   int i, j; 
   bool status; 
   status = true; 
   for (j =0; j<ND; j++) { 
 for (i=0; i<N; i++) { 
   if (oView.proc[i]! = aView[j].proc[i]) 
    status = false; 
  } 
 } 
 
    return status; 
} 
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CHAPTER 6 - Analysis 
The performance of the membership protocols was measured using fault injection 
techniques. We did a test to perform the response time on nodes. A test was performed to check 
the amount of failure the protocol can handle for different number of nodes over period of time. 
6.1 Response Time 
Figure 6.1 shows how the response time follows the cycle time. The test includes three 
test cases, best case, median case and worst case. The best case is measured by injecting a fault 
in message slot 6, the last sent static message. The median case is injected in slot 4 and the worst 
case is injected in slot 1. Figure 6.2 illustrates how the response time changes relatively to the 
cycle time by showing how many percent of the cycle time it took for the protocol to detect a 
change in the cluster. 
Figure  6.1 Absolute Response time 
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Figure  6.2 Relative Response time 
 
6.2 Failure Rate 
We conducted test where there is a fault in the system in every cycle. This fault is an 
asymmetric fault caused by a process in Node ‘N4’. The message sent by the node is detected to 
be corrupt by one node in the system. The message could be corrupted due to disturbances in the 
network. The node changes its opinion about the process and signals for a membership 
communication phase to other nodes. After membership communication phase node which 
reported suspicion about the process is ruled out to be faulty and removed from the group. Thus 
the processes which are running on the node are also not a member of the group. 
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Figure  6.3 Failure Rate for Different number of Nodes 
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In the above test, we have considered 10 processes running on different number of nodes. 
The processes are not distributed uniformly among the nodes in the system. We can see that a 
system with 8 nodes would handle the faults optimally, but our main aim is to reduce to number 
of nodes in the system. From figure 6.3 we can see that a system with 5 nodes tries to match the 
performance that we have with 8 nodes. Thus for a system with 10 processes it will be more cost 
effective to have 5 nodes. Hence we can have a system with N > 3a + 2s, where ‘a’ is 
asymmetric faults and‘s’ is symmetric faults. In classic Byzantine models, N > 3t, where t is the 
number of faults in the system.  
 
6.3 Node Failures 
From Section 6.2 we can see that Nodes that have single opinion differing from other 
nodes is removed from the group. This causes the processes running on the node to be out of the 
group. This causes overhead on the system for reintegration of the processes. We can avoid this 
situation by providing an alternative approach while making decision. If there is a Node having a 
result differing from other nodes in the system, we need to find how many such results differ. If 
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the count is more than u/2 then we should remove the node from the group. If it is less than u/2 it 
should be kept in the group. The node should correct its View about the process according to the 
opinions of other nodes. 
 
6.4 Verification Results 
 
 
Figure  6.4 Verification Time 
Time to Verify 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
4 5 6 7
No of  Nodes
Ti
m
e
Series1
 
 
 40 
Figure  6.5  Memory Required for Verification  
Memory Required for Verification
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
1400000
1600000
1800000
2000000
4 5 6 7
No of Nodes
M
em
o
ry
 
Si
z
e 
in
 
By
te
s
Memory
 
We verified the Agreement property for configurations with four, five, six and seven 
nodes. Figure 6.4 shows the time taken in checking the property presented in section 5.2. For the 
case of 7 nodes, it leads to exhaustion of memory resources. The figure 6.5 clearly show that the 
state space size increases exponentially with the number of nodes in the system. 
Nevertheless, to be able to check the membership protocol for 6 nodes gives us a high 
confidence level in its correctness, because with 6 nodes we are able to generate rather subtle 
fault scenarios, such as the masked faults, that arise with the simultaneous fault of two nodes, 
which may be either members of the group or attempting to join. Although checking the 
correctness of the membership protocol for 8 nodes would provide an even higher confidence, 
because with that many nodes we could consider scenarios with 3 simultaneous faults. 
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CHAPTER 7 - Conclusion 
7.1 Conclusion 
In this thesis we have examined an existing membership protocol for a FlexRay system. 
The protocol was modeled on UPPAAL to check for the correctness of the protocol, using 
properties to check if the model meets all requirements. The results obtained show that the 
membership protocol satisfies its specification for configurations of up to 6 nodes, providing us 
further assurance on its correctness. We believe that the abstraction applied to this model is not 
far from the actual membership protocol.  
 
7.2 Future Work 
The future work need to be done is to compare the model with the TTA validation model 
[13]. We will be able to determine how both TTP and FlexRay work with their membership 
protocol.  
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